International Dimensions of Monetary Policy by John B. Taylor
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of Economic
Research
Volume Title: International Dimensions of Monetary Policy
Volume Author/Editor: Jordi Gali and Mark J. Gertler, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-27886-7
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/gert07-1
Conference Date: June 11-13, 2007
Publication Date: February 2010
Chapter Title: Globalization and Monetary Policy: Missions Impossible
Chapter Author: John B. Taylor
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c0787
Chapter pages in book: (609 - 624)609
12
Globalization and Monetary Policy
Missions Impossible
John B. Taylor
Globalization is not a new issue in monetary economics. Indeed, for at least 
three decades the forces of globalization have been presenting challenges for 
both monetary policy and the theory that underlies it. The challenges never 
seem easy. When I look back on the history of this period and consider the 
challenges faced, I am reminded of the theme from Mission Impossible: in 
one episode after another, people pursued a seemingly impossible mission 
and in the end the mission was, amazingly, accomplished.
In this chapter, I examine three such missions impossible in the area of 
globalization and monetary policy. The ﬁ  rst—M:i:I—begins thirty years 
ago, the second—M:i:II—begins ten years ago, and the third—M:i:III—
takes place today. For each mission, I discuss: (a) the theory, or the ideas 
developed to accomplish the mission; (b) the policy, or the implementation 
of these ideas; and (c) the results. Unlike the movies, the connection between 
the theory, the policy, and the results is not obvious, but speculating about 
the connection is intriguing.
12.1    Mission  Impossible  I
Go back thirty years to the mid-   to late-  1970s. Inﬂ  ation in the United 
States was into double digits and had been rising for a decade. The volatility 
of inﬂ  ation was also high: consumer price index (CPI) inﬂ  ation reached 12 
John B. Taylor is Professor of Economics and Senior Fellow, Stanford University and the 
Hoover Institution.
This is a written version of a poolside talk given at the conference, “The International Dimen-
sions of Monetary Policy,” Girona, Spain, June 2007, sponsored by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research. I wish to thank Andrew Levin and Josephine Smith for useful comments 
and assistance.610    John  B.  Taylor
percent in 1975, fell to 5 percent in 1977, and then increased to 15 percent 
before the decade was over. Like inﬂ  ation, the volatility of real gross domes-
tic product (GDP) was very high: the standard deviation of real GDP growth 
was about 3 percent, recessions came frequently, and expansions were short- 
lived. According to NBER dating, there were recessions in 1969 and 1970, 
1973 to 1975, 1980, and 1981 and 1982; and some had chronicled another 
recession in 1977 and 1978—a growth recession. So there was a recession 
about every three or four years. There seemed to be a connection between the 
ﬂ  uctuations in real GDP and inﬂ  ation; each time inﬂ  ation rose and reached 
a new peak it was followed by a recession, in boom-  bust cycle fashion.
There was also a global connection. The Bretton Woods ﬁ  xed exchange 
rate system had broken down in the early 1970s. Hence, central banks around 
the world were groping to ﬁ  nd an alternative to the ﬁ  xed exchange rate that 
had guided so many of them in the past. The lack of a workable frame-
work for monetary policy, ﬂ  uctuations in the velocity of money, and an 
incomplete understanding of the inﬂ   ation- output  trade- oﬀ created similar 
instabilities in inﬂ  ation and output around the world. The standard devia-
tion of real GDP growth in the other G7 countries was comparable to that 
in the United States.
12.1.1      The Objective Function and the Mission
It was also during the 1970s that economists—especially macroecono-
mists and monetary economists—began to focus explicitly on ﬁ  nding poli-
cies that could improve this economic performance. Given the dismal macro-
economic conditions at the time, this intense policy focus was not surprising. 
It was at this time that researchers began to use an explicit objective function 
in their research papers. The objective was simply to reduce the volatility of 
inﬂ  ation and real GDP. Soon it was hard to ﬁ  nd a paper in which the policy 
objective was not stated. It was usually written down algebraically in the 
form of a quadratic objective function
(1)  Var(y)  (1)Var(),
where y represented real GDP relative to normal levels,  represented the 
inﬂ  ation rate, and Var represented the variance, or expected squared devia-
tion of inﬂ  ation or real GDP from a target. The weight  described the 
relative importance of each variable and for most of the models there was 
a trade-  oﬀ between these two variances. See, for example, Sargent and Wal-
lace (1975), Kydland- Prescott (1977), and Taylor (1979). The purpose of the 
research was to ﬁ  nd a policy to minimize the objective function, or more 
simply put, to increase output and price stability. The form of the policy to 
accomplish this was either a policy rule for the monetary instruments, or 
alternatively, a dynamic time path for these instruments.
Because the actual Var() and Var(y) were large at the time, the research 
seemed highly relevant and important. But it also seemed diﬃcult, if not Globalization and Monetary Policy    6 1 1
impossible, and hence the analogy with the dramatic opening of a mission 
impossible episode: “Your mission, should you choose to accept it, is to reduce 
inﬂ  ation and output volatility around the world.” The “you” in this analogy—
the Impossible Mission Force (IMF)—was the community of researchers 
and policy makers interested in monetary policy and theory—monetary 
economists both inside and outside central banks. Focused on the mission, 
they went about their research, bringing a vast array of new ideas to bear on 
the problem. They introduced rational expectations into the macro models, 
devised new theories of price and wage rigidities, estimated parameters with 
new econometric techniques, solved more and more complex models, and 
optimized with stochastic control theory and dynamic programming. Many 
of the new research ideas—including the application of rational expecta-
tions, the Lucas (1976) critique, and the time inconsistency problem—led 
to a greater focus on formulating the policy decisions as a policy rule rather 
than as a onetime path for the instruments.
Looking back, the huge amount of research output was amazing. But 
much more amazing was that the mission was actually accomplished. The 
variance of inﬂ  ation and the variance of real GDP did come down, and 
by a very large amount. Compared to the recession-  prone economy of the 
past, the United States went into a period where recessions occurred only 
once every nine or ten years on average, far less frequent than once every 
three or four years. Only two recessions occurred in the twenty-  ﬁ  ve years 
between the end of the 1981 to 1982 recession in the United States and 2007, 
and these two recessions have been very short and mild by historical com-
parison. The standard deviation of real GDP growth was cut in half to 1.5 per-
cent. Though this improvement began in the United States in the early 
1980s, it was not until the 1990s that people began to document and study 
the decline in volatility of real GDP, a phenomenon that is now called the 
Great Moderation or the Long Boom. The improvement did not only occur 
in the United States. Similar improvements were seen in countries around 
the world. The G7 countries as a whole, for example, also cut the standard 
deviation of real GDP in half.
There is a debate about the reasons for the improvements. I have argued 
(Taylor 1998) that they were caused mainly by changes in monetary policy, 
implying that the mission was accomplished through more than luck alone. 
There is also a debate about whether the research inﬂ  uenced the changes 
in monetary policy—about whether these ideas had actual consequences. 
Although causality and inﬂ  uences are complex and diﬃcult to prove, there 
is certainly a close relationship in time between the monetary research, the 
monetary policy, and the improvement in economic stability. This close 
intertemporal relationship has been nicely captured by Cecchetti et al. 
(2007). Figure 12.1 is drawn directly from the Cecchetti et al. paper. It takes 
the Taylor rule as representative of the type of policy recommendation that 
emerged from the research, and shows that the improvement in economic 612    John  B.  Taylor
performance occurred at about the same time that monetary policy began to 
follow that kind of recommendation. Again this does not prove causation, 
and indeed the timing is so close that two-  way causation may be involved, 
although it is clear that the monetary policy rules were meant to be norma-
tive recommendations rather than simply descriptions of actual policy.
Figure 12.1 also illustrates the global nature of these changes: the close 
correlation and timing between the greater adherence of actual policy 
to recommended policy rules and the better economic performance can 
be seen in other countries, not only the United States. The connection 
between the ideas, the policies, and the results are a global phenomenon 
that spread quickly around the world—certainly another manifestation of 
globalization.
12.1.2      Out of Global Models Came Simple Rules
Although the rational expectations models that were ﬁ  rst used to ﬁ  nd 
optimal monetary policy rules in the 1970s were closed economy models, by 
the early 1980s monetary policy evaluation was moving rapidly in a global 
direction, and ultimately the recommended policy rules for the interest rate, 
like the one plotted in ﬁ  gure 12.1, emerged from new multicountry models 
with rational expectations. Examples include the modeling eﬀorts at the Fed-
eral Reserve Board, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Stanford 
(Taylor 1993)—all participants in the Brookings project on monetary policy 
regimes (Bryant, Hooper, and Mann 1993). This evolution of models in an 
international direction was motivated by the policy mission. These M:i:I 
models were the ﬁ  rst multicountry policy evaluation models with rational 
expectations, staggered price and wage setting, and a focus on evaluating 
Fig. 12.1    Empirical evidence of monetary policy regime shifts from deviations 
from a policy rule
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monetary policy as a policy rule with a speciﬁ  c objective function. They 
also usually assumed perfect capital mobility, interdependence of capital 
and foreign exchange markets, expectations theories of the term structure 
of interest rates, uncovered interest rate parity, and direct price setting links 
between diﬀerent countries. Designed so that they could address questions 
about exchange rate regimes—ﬁ  xed versus ﬂ  exible—the models focused on 
ﬁ  nding monetary policy rules to minimize objective functions like (1) for 
many countries.
12.1.3      Zero Response to the Exchange Rate
The exchange rate played a signiﬁ  cant role in these models. Its expected 
rate of change aﬀected relative rates of return from holding one currency 
versus another, as capital could move around the globe to obtain the best 
return. Its level aﬀected the relative price of goods in diﬀerent countries and 
thus aﬀected exports and imports. Its past rate of change aﬀected inﬂ  ation 
through the pass-  through mechanism.
With such a signiﬁ  cant role for the exchange rate in the models, it was 
surprising to everyone that they called for monetary policy rules in which 
the interest rate settings by the central bank should not react directly to the 
exchange rate. Rather, optimal policy decisions should respond primarily to 
inﬂ  ation and real GDP. More technically, to minimize the objective function, 
the central bank’s policy rule for the interest rate rule should include inﬂ  ation 
(as a deviation from the target rate of inﬂ  ation) and real GDP (relative to 
potential GDP), but not the level or rate of change in the exchange rate. To 
be sure, more recent work on small open economy models (e.g., Ball 1999) 
shows that reacting to the exchange rate can improve economic performance, 
but the gains are small and do not hold up across all models. Nevertheless, 
as I describe in my following discussion of Mission Impossible III, there is 
now a generation of M:i:III multicountry rational expectations models with 
staggered price setting. These models might yield diﬀerent policy results. 
However, since the M:i:I models assumed perfect capital mobility, it is hard 
to see why more globalization of ﬁ  nancial markets alone would change the 
results.
There are two explanations for the minimal role for the exchange rate 
(Taylor 2001). First, exchange rates are volatile compared with real GDP 
and inﬂ  ation, so reacting to them could cause the interest rate to be too 
volatile, which would have harmful eﬀects on the economy. Second, respond-
ing to inﬂ  ation automatically provides a response to the exchange rate. A 
depreciation of the exchange rate, to some degree, passes through to inﬂ  a-
tion. Thus, raising the interest rate as inﬂ  ation rises is in part a response to 
a depreciation of the exchange rate.
12.1.4      Not to Worry about Coordination in the Design of Policy Rules
Given that the international monetary models had strong links between 
diﬀerent countries, it was natural to ask whether a central bank in one 614    John  B.  Taylor
country should react directly to events in another country. For example, 
a recession abroad will tend to lower inﬂ  ation at home through the impact 
of import prices and other channels; thus, an optimal response to a foreign 
recession might be to lower the interest rate to keep the inﬂ  ation rate on 
target. The formal way to address this question is to consider the possibility 
of coordinating the design of monetary policy rules across countries (Taylor 
1985). Using game theory terminology, the Cournot-  Nash solution repre-
sents the noncooperative case; it occurs when policymakers in one country 
take as given policy reactions in the other countries—as if the Fed staﬀ 
takes the policy rules of other central banks as given when it does alternative 
policy simulations—and that the Fed reacts optimally given those foreign 
policy rules. The Cournot-  Nash solution assumes that other central banks 
do the same thing, and that there is an equilibrium where the rule that every 
central bank takes as given for other central banks is actually optimal for 
those other central banks. In contrast, the coordinated or cooperative solu-
tion is where all central banks jointly maximize a global objective function 
that incorporates objective functions like (1) for all countries.
The results of the research were that the cooperative solution entailed 
a smaller response of the interest rate to an inﬂ  ation rate increase than 
the Cournot-  Nash solution. When a central bank raises its interest rate in 
response to an increase in inﬂ  ation rate at home, the exchange rate tends 
to appreciate in that country and to depreciate in the other countries. The 
depreciation abroad tends to be inﬂ  ationary abroad and requires that the 
central banks in the other countries tighten. It is also optimal to react to 
inﬂ  ation developments in other countries, but the response is diﬀerent in 
the cooperative versus the noncooperative case. In the cooperative case, the 
interest rate is cut when inﬂ  ation rises in the other countries; this provides 
an appreciation of the currency in the other country and mitigates the inﬂ  a-
tion rise abroad and the output eﬀects at home. However, according to the 
estimated models the eﬀects were very small quantitatively, and as a practical 
matter the policy recommendations could ignore these international eﬀects 
(Carlozzi and Taylor 1985).
12.2    Mission  Impossible  II
For our second example we go back to another period of dismal economic 
performance: the period of emerging market crises in the 1990s, or more 
precisely from 1994 to 2002. Table 12.1 lists the large number of crises that 
occurred around the world during this period—starting with the Mexican 
crisis in 1994 and the associated Tequilla contagion, continuing onto the 
Asian crisis and its contagion, the Russian crisis and its contagion, and 
ending with Uruguay in 2002. Guillermo Calvo (2005) aptly characterized 
the crises during this period in his Graham Lecture at Princeton University, 
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else that we have seen—at least since World War II.” The frequency and 
spread was so great and unusual that the period is better described as one 
“eight- year  ﬁ  nancial crisis” rather than eight years of ﬁ  nancial crises.
Thousands of research papers have been written about this crisis period, 
many with the goal of better understanding and ultimately bringing an end 
to the crisis period. Hence, again we have the analogy with the dramatic 
opening of a mission impossible episode: “Your mission, should you choose to 
accept it, is to reduce the frequency and global spread of ﬁ  nancial crises.” The 
“you” in Mission Impossible II is the international community of monetary 
and ﬁ  nance experts both inside and outside of governments and central 
banks, with the IMF and its staﬀ playing a much bigger role than in Mission 
Impossible I. Examples include the participants in the NBER project on 
crises in emerging markets under the direction of Jeﬀrey Frankel, Sebastian 
Edwards, and Michael Dooley; this project alone resulted in thirteen confer-
ences and eight books during the crisis period (see www.nber.org/  crisis/  ).
12.2.1      The End of the Eight-  Year Crisis
Remarkably, and similarly with Mission Impossible I, this impossible 
mission also seems to have become a mission accomplished. As table 12.1 
shows, we have not had a ﬁ  nancial crisis or contagion of the kind we expe-
rienced regularly during the crisis period anywhere on the globe since 2002. 
And while we will certainly have ﬁ  nancial crises in the future, the eight-  year 
crisis period has come to an end. Figure 12.2 plots the spread between the 
interest rates on sovereign debt in emerging market countries and interest 
rates on U.S. Treasuries. It shows how much risk levels have declined since 
the crisis period; even allowing for some overshooting there has been a dra-
matic change.
The debate about why this crisis period ended has just begun, and only 
a few papers have been written about it, is in contrast to the debate about 
what caused the Great Moderation, which has been going on for a decade. 
In my view, changes in economic policy, motivated in part by new economic 
ideas, played a big role in ending the crisis period; there were changes both 
in individual policies in the emerging market countries and in international 
monetary policy conducted by the International Monetary Fund and its 
major shareholders. Because comparatively little has been written to explain 
the improved performance since 2002—it is only the ﬁ  ve-  year anniversary—
it is more diﬃcult to trace causality than in the case of Mission Impossible I, 
though the correlation and the timing between the ideas, the policies, and 
the results are equally clear.
One of the most valuable recommendations that came out of the re-
search on ﬁ  nancial crises is that individual emerging market countries 
could take steps to prevent or at least signiﬁ  cantly reduce the likelihood 
of crises. Models of ﬁ  nancial crises developed in the 1990s and the actual 
experiences of policymakers with crises in the 1990s showed that currency 616    John  B.  Taylor
mismatches—including large stocks of debt denominated in foreign curren-
cies—could convert a currency depreciation into a major debt crisis (Gold-
stein and Turner 2004). They also showed that overly expansionary mon-
etary policies under a ﬁ  xed exchange rate could lead to a sudden and sharp 
depreciation, once investors realized that reserves would be insuﬃcient to 
maintain the increasingly overvalued exchange rate.
The policy implications of this research were clear: avoid currency 
mismatches, get inﬂ  ation down and keep it down, adopt a more ﬂ  exible 
exchange rate policy, keep the debt to GDP ratio sustainable, and accumulate 
Table 12.1  Eight years of crises or one eight-  year crisis?
Tequila eﬀect  
  Mexico:  1994–1995
  Argentina:  1995–1996
Asian crisis contagion
  Thailand  1997–1998
  Indonesia  1997–1998
  Malaysia  1997–1998
  Korea  1997–1998
Russian contagion
  Russia:  1998
  Brazil:  1998–2002
  Romania:  1998–1999
  Ecuador:  1998–1999
  Argentina:  1999–2001
  Turkey:  2000–2001
  Uruguay:  2002
  No major crises or contagion: 2002–present 
Fig. 12.2    Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI) 1 spread by regionGlobalization and Monetary Policy    6 1 7
more foreign reserves. Many emerging market countries have learned such 
lessons and have moved toward these sensible policies. Certainly reserves are 
higher and inﬂ  ation is lower than during the eight-  year crisis period. And, 
just as predicted by the theory and hoped by the theorists, the number of 
crises has declined.
In addition the contagion of the crises has declined sharply, which has 
itself reduced the likelihood of crises. To see this, compare the global con-
tagion that occurred following the Russian ﬁ  nancial crisis in 1998 with the 
complete absence of contagion following the Argentine crisis just three years 
later in 2001 (Taylor 2007a, chapter 3). More recently, ﬂ  are ups in Thailand 
or Turkey seemed to have little impact abroad, unlike the 1990s. I believe 
that policy changes in the operation of the international ﬁ  nancial system 
have been largely responsible for this decline in contagion, and that these 
changes were also motivated by theory.
12.2.2      Predictability and the Exceptional Access Framework of the IMF
The most important international monetary policy lesson learned from 
the crisis period was the need for the IMF to change the way it responds to 
ﬁ  nancial crises—most importantly, to be more deliberative and “predict-
able” about when it would exceed normal lending limits and provide large-
  scale assistance. In my view, this lack of predictability was a factor in the 
contagion of crises. According to most economics theories of contagion, in 
which uninformed traders tend to follow informed traders, surprise changes 
in policy are much more likely to cause contagion than predicted or antici-
pated changes in policy. Of course, the idea that anticipated policy changes 
have a smaller impact than unanticipated changes goes back to the early 
days of rational expectations modeling.
The lack of predictability was most evident in the case of Russia, where 
the IMF increased support in July 1998 and then one month later (in August 
1998) indicated that it would remove support. This surprise was a reason 
for the global contagion at the time. There was also a lack of predictability 
of IMF responses in other crises. The Asian countries still feel that the 
IMF was not as responsive to their crises as it was in the case of Mexico. 
The initial refusal to provide additional funds to Uruguay in 2002 which, 
if not reversed, would have severely disrupted the payments system was 
another example (Taylor 2007b). This assessment is not meant to be critical 
of individual people at the IMF. Indeed, the lack of predictability was due 
to a lack of a clear framework about how the IMF should operate in such 
situations; it reﬂ  ected considerable disagreement among the shareholders 
about the role of the IMF.
Fortunately, the shareholders of the IMF have come into much closer 
agreement on this issue, and they did so at about the same time the cri-
sis period ended. They asked that the IMF introduce a more predictable 
decision framework into its operations, and the IMF has done so. Called 618    John  B.  Taylor
the exceptional access framework (EAF), it was put in place at the IMF in 
early 2003. The EAF represents a signiﬁ  cant change in policy for the IMF, 
and it reﬂ  ected a change in position by the G7 countries, and in particular 
by the United States. In an action plan in April 2002 the G7 said “we are 
prepared to limit oﬃcial sector lending to normal access levels except when 
circumstances justify an exception. . . . Limiting oﬃcial sector lending and 
developing private sector lending are essential parts of our Action Plan.” 
The EAF stated exactly what the exceptions were. It lists a set of principles or 
rules that determine whether IMF support will be provided. Its aim, again in 
the words of the G7, was “to increase predictability and reduce uncertainty 
about oﬃcial policy actions in the emerging markets.”
12.2.3      Time Inconsistency and More Predictable 
Restructurings of Sovereign Debt
One of the barriers to adopting the EAF was the lack of a reliable frame-
work for countries to engage with their private sector creditors if and when 
sovereign debt had to be restructured. Without such a framework it would 
be very diﬃcult for the IMF to adhere to any limits or rules. In typical time 
inconsistency fashion, the IMF and their shareholders could say they were 
adopting limits, but then, when the crisis occurred, would be expected to 
abandon those limits. To deal with this time inconsistency problem, a new 
mechanism was proposed for the bond contracts. This mechanism—called 
collective action clauses (CACs)—allowed bond holders to agree with their 
sovereign debtors to restructure debt if need be. Hence, a feasible and under-
standable plan B would be available to countries, allowing the IMF to say 
no if the limits were exceeded.
After a year of intense discussions in the international community, Mex-
ico issued bonds in New York with collective action clauses (CACs) for 
the ﬁ  rst time in February 2003. Many other countries then followed. These 
clauses represent a great improvement in the process of restructuring debt. 
In fact, they go hand-  in-  hand with the EAF: the reason why the EAF was 
acceptable to IMF shareholders, management, and staﬀ was that there was 
a procedure (the CACs) that countries could use to restructure their debt 
without large-  scale borrowing from the IMF. In technical terms, the CACs 
solved the time inconsistency problem.
12.3    Mission  Impossible  III
The third example of globalization and monetary policy takes place in 
the present, and it ﬂ  ows naturally from the ﬁ  rst two examples: “Your mis-
sion, should you choose to accept it, is to prevent the forces of globalization 
from reversing the missions already accomplished.” The “you” for Mission 
Impossible III is again the international community of monetary experts 
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papers at the conference (included in this volume) and many others doing 
research on the global dimensions of monetary policy: Fisher (2006); Hel-
bling, Jaumotte, and Sommer (2006); Kohn (2006); and Rogoﬀ (2006) are 
recent examples. In deciding whether or not to accept this mission, you 
might ask, “Do we really need a mission?” Well, why else do this research; 
why publish another NBER conference volume? Or you might question the 
mission: “Is this mission really ambitious enough? Shouldn’t we try to do 
more with Mission I and II?” Well, it is hard to see how macroeconomic 
conditions around the world could get much better than they have been for 
the past two plus decades. Preventing them from deteriorating so that the 
world economy can grow smoothly is diﬃcult enough. Indeed, it may be the 
most challenging of the three missions impossible I describe here.
12.3.1      Do Not Switch Regimes without a Very Good Reason
In some ways the chapters in this conference volume are already pursuing 
this mission by building and simulating multicountry rational expectations 
models to evaluate monetary policy rules. For example, the paper presented 
in this conference volume by Nicoletta Batini (chapter 5), ﬁ  nds that not 
responding to the exchange rate in the monetary policy rule is nearly opti-
mal, similar to the research described in Mission Impossible I. Another ex-
ample is the paper presented by Frank Smets (chapter 3, this volume), which 
investigated the gains from monetary policy coordination among countries; 
they ﬁ  nd that these gains are small, much as the research I described under 
Mission Impossible I, though as Chris Sims argued in his comments on that 
paper, there is still a need to consider coordination in the design of interest 
rate rules.
There is an important diﬀerence in the papers used in Mission Impossible 
III compared with those in Mission Impossible I, however: the recent M:i:III 
models are based on a more thorough set of microfoundations and employ 
a welfare analysis based on individual utility rather than on the objective of 
reducing the ﬂ  uctuations in real GDP and inﬂ  ation (see Woodford 2003). 
Therefore, they may be better able to deal with sudden changes in the global 
economy for which we have little empirical experience.
Nevertheless, the results of very recent research suggest that the forces 
of globalization should not change the way monetary policy has operated 
in the United States and other countries during the past two decades. But 
is the world changing more rapidly than models? Are there changes that 
central banks should be on the lookout for as the globalization process 
continues?
12.3.2      Be on the Lookout for These Changes
How could the forces of globalization lead to a deterioration of monetary 
policy? One of the most notable structural changes in the global economy in 
recent years is the sharp reduction in exchange rate pass- through. Some have 620    John  B.  Taylor
attributed this decline to globalization and the increased foreign competi-
tion; others see it as due to the greater focus on monetary policy on price 
stability (Taylor 2000). Whatever the reason, the reduction in exchange rate 
pass-  through due to a more inﬂ  ation-  focused monetary policy has reduced 
further the need to coordinate policy in the game theory sense that I dis-
cussed previously. Hence, while the forces of globalization might suggest the 
need for more coordination, the reality could be just the opposite.
Another important change is the reduction in the slope of the short-  run 
Phillips curve (Roberts 2006). Some have argued that this change has been 
due to globalization (Rogoﬀ 2003) with greater competition reducing prices, 
though this is inconsistent with inﬂ  ation being a monetary phenomenon, 
unless one can show that the greater competition aﬀects monetary policy 
decisions. Another possibility is that the lower slope of the Phillips curve is 
due to a greater impact of inﬂ  ation in other countries. If so, then the lower 
coeﬃcient on output in the inﬂ  ation equation would be oﬀset by higher 
coeﬃcients in other countries’ inﬂ  ation equations, but Ihrig et al. (2007) 
show that this is not the case. Another possibility is that direct linkages 
between wages in diﬀerent countries have strengthened due to oﬀ- shoring, 
though there is still little evidence of an increased wage- to- wage connection. 
Another explanation is due to Roberts (2006), who argues that the slope has 
gotten ﬂ  atter because monetary policy has become more responsive—the 
coeﬃcients in the central bank’s policy rule have increased. In other words, 
it is not changes in the global economy that have caused the Phillips curve 
to ﬂ  atten, but rather successful monetary policy. If so, adjusting policy to be 
more accommodative to inﬂ  ation—which might be called for if this were 
a structural change—would lead to a return to suboptimal performance.
Another example of how globalization can adversely aﬀect monetary pol-
icy decisions may have already begun, though much more study is needed. 
When thinking about monetary policy in an international setting, it is often 
stated that central banks need to consider the interest rate set by other cen-
tral banks. If there is concern about exchange rate ﬂ  uctuations, then moving 
the interest rate too far or too rapidly away from prevailing international 
interest rates could cause the currency to appreciate or depreciate, something 
that the central bank might want to avoid. Many central bankers, even those 
with ﬂ  exible exchange rate policies, watch the U.S. federal funds rate set by 
the Federal Reserve when making policy decisions. In principle, the Fed 
could also take foreign interest rates into account, especially interest rate 
decisions of large trading partners such as the eurozone or Japan.
Consider the case of a two-  country model; it could apply to Europe and 
the United States. Suppose that interest rates at the Fed and the European 
Central Bank (ECB) are set according to the following policy rules:
(2)  i  i∗  1.5  .5y
i∗  ∗i  1.5∗  .5y∗,Globalization and Monetary Policy    6 2 1
where the asterisk represents the ECB and i is the short- term policy interest 
rate,  is the inﬂ  ation rate, and y is the deviation of real GDP from trend 
growth. It is reasonable to assume that 0   	 1 and 0  ∗ 	 1. Without 
the foreign interest rate terms (  ∗  0), these equations would be two 
Taylor rules, which for the sake of this argument we take as optimal. (Assum-
ing that another rule is optimal will lead to similar results.) Solving these two 
equations for the interest rates results in:




1  ∗ [1.5  .5y  (1.5∗  .5y∗)],
with an analogous equation for Europe. In other words, the inﬂ  ation and 
output response coeﬃcients in the optimal rule are multiplied by one over 
one minus the product of the two interest rate response coeﬃcients. For 
reasonably large responses to the foreign interest rate in both countries, 
the results could be a signiﬁ  cant departure from what would otherwise be 
an optimal policy for each country. Unless it is oﬀset by changes in other 
parameters, large foreign interest rate reactions could lead to a policy 
mistake.
How plausible is this kind of mistake? How large could it be? Some esti-
mated values for the response coeﬃcients are suggestive. For the eurozone, 
consider the sample from 2000.1 to 2006.4. For this period, I measured 
inﬂ  ation as the four- quarter rate of change in the harmonized index of con-
sumer prices and the real GDP gap as the deviation of log real GDP from its 
Hodrick-  Prescott trend. I ﬁ  rst computed the residual from a Taylor rule. I 
then regressed this residual on a constant and on the federal funds rate. The 
estimated coeﬃcient on the federal funds rate is .21 and statistically signiﬁ  -
cant with a standard error of .056. The plot of the actual and ﬁ  tted values 
from this regression is shown in ﬁ  gure 12.3. A good part, but not all of the 
negative residual (where the ECB policy rate is below the rule) is “explained” 
by the federal funds rate being lower than normal. If one simply adds the 
federal funds rate to an estimated policy rule (with a constant term) in the 
eurozone during this period—rather than use the residuals from the Taylor 
rule—the estimated coeﬃcient is .11.
For the United States, I also measured inﬂ  ation as the four- quarter rate of 
change in the consumer price index and the real GDP gap as the deviation 
of log real GDP from its Hodrick- Prescott trend. Using the same procedure 
as before with the foreign interest rate given by a Special Drawing Rights 
(SDR)- weighted interest rate (excluding the United States and reweighting), 
the coeﬃcient on the foreign interest rate is .93 with a standard error of 
0.15. For the period from 2000.1 to 2006.3 the actual and ﬁ  tted values from 
the regression estimated over that period are shown in ﬁ  gure 12.4. Again, a 
substantial part of the gap between the actual policy and the policy rule is 
“explained” by the foreign interest rate.
These strong foreign interest rate eﬀects are not unusual, and are found Fig. 12.3    Residual from eurozone policy rule (1.5, 0.5)
Fig. 12.4    Residual from U.S. policy rule (1.5, 0.5)Globalization and Monetary Policy    6 2 3
in estimates of policy rules at other central banks. They could, of course, 
be spurious. During this sample period the Federal Reserve apparently was 
worried about the risks of deﬂ  ation and therefore may have cut the interest 
rate below what it otherwise would be.
Nevertheless, if Mission Impossible III is to be achieved, it is necessary 
for researchers inside and outside central banks to be on the lookout for the 
type of problem illustrated by this and my other examples.
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